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## INTRODUCTION

“But this isn’t *seeing!*!”—“But this is seeing!”—It must be possible to give both remarks a conceptual justification.

But this is seeing! *In what sense* is it seeing?

“The phenomenon is at first surprising, but a physiological explanation of it will certainly be found.”—

Our problem is not a causal but a conceptual one. . . .

“Is it a *genuine* visual experience?” The question is: in what sense is it one?

Here it is *difficult* to see that what is at issue is the fixing of concepts.

A *concept* forces itself on one. (This is what you must not forget.)  
—Ludwig Wittgenstein,  
*Philosophical Investigations*

Intellectualism does not talk about the senses because for it sensations and senses appear only when I turn back to the concrete act of knowledge in order to analyze it. I then distinguish in it a contingent matter and a necessary form, but matter is an unreal phase and not a separable element of the total act. Therefore there are not the senses, but only consciousness.

—Maurice Merleau-Ponty,  
*Phenomenology of Perception*

Finally, and in more general terms, it appears increasingly more difficult to conceive a system of images and objects whose *signifieds* can exist independently of language: to perceive what a substance signifies is inevitably to fall back on the individuation of language: there is no meaning which is not designated, and the world of signifieds is none other than that of language.

—Roland Barthes,  
*Elements of Semiology*